Following claims by US President Donald Trump that American airstrikes had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities, officials have warned it remains far too early to gauge the full impact on Tehran’s nuclear programme.
Sunday’s strikes have left a cloud of uncertainty, particularly over the fate and current location of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile—material that could swiftly be converted into weapons-grade fuel.
Where is Iran’s Enriched Uranium?
The US air raids, conducted using B-2 stealth bombers, targeted three critical Iranian nuclear sites: Isfahan and the main enrichment facilities at Fordo and Natanz. Although significant damage has been reported, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has raised serious concerns about Iran’s remaining near-weapons-grade uranium stock.
According to the UN nuclear watchdog, Iran currently possesses around 408.6 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent purity — a technical step away from the 90 per cent required for a nuclear bomb. IAEA inspectors last verified this stockpile on 10 June. In theory, that quantity of uranium could yield material for over nine nuclear weapons if fully enriched.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on Monday urged Iran to grant immediate access to its nuclear facilities, stressing the need to “account for” this sensitive material.
Apprehension over the stockpile’s safety intensified after Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, informed the IAEA on June 13—the day Israel launched its military assault—that Tehran had implemented “special measures to protect nuclear equipment and material.”
Satellite imagery taken days before the US strikes revealed unusual vehicle movements near Fordo’s entrance. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed Israel possessed “interesting intelligence” but declined to elaborate. On Monday, Israel announced fresh strikes targeting access routes to Fordo.
“It will be difficult, if not impossible, to locate all of Iran’s 60 per cent enriched uranium, much of which is stored in small canisters easily transported by car,” said Kelsey Davenport, a nuclear expert with the Arms Control Association.
US Vice President JD Vance told ABC News that Iran’s ability to process this stockpile into weapons-grade uranium had been crippled.
Is Iran Still Capable of Producing a Nuclear Bomb?
Experts remain cautious when assessing Iran’s remaining capacity. Before the attacks, Iran operated roughly 22,000 centrifuges, the machines essential for enriching uranium. Many of these were reportedly damaged at Natanz, while Fordo suffered “very significant damage” due to the highly sensitive nature of its centrifuges, according to Grossi.
However, the exact number of centrifuges still operational or stored at undisclosed locations remains unclear.
“With 60 per cent enriched uranium and a few hundred advanced centrifuges, Iran retains the technical capacity to pursue weaponisation — and now may have stronger political motives to do so,” warned Davenport.
What Are the Proliferation Risks?
Before hostilities escalated, the IAEA reported having “no indication” of any organised Iranian programme to build nuclear weapons. But with inspectors currently denied access, the agency has lost visibility over Tehran’s activities.
Grossi cautioned that the international non-proliferation framework, which has been central to global security, risks collapsing altogether, calling for an urgent return to diplomatic negotiations.
Iran, a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1970, has been obligated to declare its nuclear material to the IAEA. But recently, Tehran has hinted at a possible withdrawal from the treaty, accusing the watchdog of collaborating with Israel in its “war of aggression.”
On Monday, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, described the US strikes as an “unlawful act of aggression” that had inflicted an “irreparable blow” to the global non-proliferation system.
Eric Brewer of the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative warned of a serious risk that Iran might expel inspectors or deny them access altogether.
“Over time, Iran could also develop a covert nuclear programme, much like North Korea did after withdrawing from the NPT in 2003,” Brewer said.
