Nigeria’s security architecture is confronting its most turbulent test in over a decade, as a dangerous confluence of insurgency, banditry, cult violence, and political kidnappings stretches the state’s capacity to respond. Recent coordinated attacks on military bases in Borno—specifically Dikwa, Gajiram, Marte, and Rann—suggest a strategic shift by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). No longer content with ambushes, insurgents are now launching frontal assaults on fortified army formations, with alarming effectiveness.
According to a recent SBM Intelligence report, these attacks are not just militarily bold; they are symbolically potent. They aim to demoralise troops, plunder weapon stockpiles, and broadcast state vulnerability. In Rann, for instance, militants looted RPGs and AK-47s—an echo of 2023 trends, where over 60% of base-level weapons were lost in similar raids. Meanwhile, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), like the one in Mafa that injured five children, continue to cause severe civilian casualties. UNICEF estimates that children represent roughly half of explosive-related casualties, making the proliferation of IEDs not just a military concern but a humanitarian emergency.
From Forts to Farmlands: A Nation Under Siege
Nigeria’s insecurity is no longer isolated to the Northeast. In the North Central region, the Mahmuda faction of Boko Haram—long thought marginal—has established an operational presence in Kwara and Niger States. Despite the arrest of 12 suspected members, the group’s sustained activity highlights two structural issues: underestimation by security agencies and the limited responsiveness of current counterterrorism strategies.
A new military base in Kainji reflects the government’s default response: increase troop presence. However, as the experience in Niger and Plateau shows, presence alone does not equal control. Targeted operations—like the DSS-led dismantling of ISWAP cells in Benue and Osun—demonstrate that intelligence-led disruption is far more effective than blunt force deployment.
Meanwhile, pastoral conflict in Taraba continues to deepen, driven by land disputes and communal rivalries. With Fulani militias gaining ground and the state failing to intervene decisively, there is a growing risk of retaliatory cycles spiralling into open conflict.
Banditry as Governance in the North West
In Sokoto and Katsina, notorious warlord Bello Turji has transitioned from bandit to proto-warlord. He now levies “taxes”—₦25 million per village—and enforces them through terror. In Bafarawa, residents evacuated en masse following his seven-day ultimatum. Similar displacements occurred in Goronyo and Illela in recent months.
These are not isolated incidents but a strategy of psychological dominance and territorial control. Yet community resistance—like that seen in Maigora—offers glimmers of hope. The danger, however, lies in the predictable cycle: bandit attacks, community retaliation, and deadly reprisals. Without robust state protection, these cycles entrench the violence Turji thrives on.
Urban Unrest and Political Targeting
Further south, the pattern continues. In Lagos, a man was dismembered in broad daylight by cultists in Egbeda. In Delta and Bayelsa, rival cult groups like Vikings, Aiye, and Buccaneers clash for dominance, particularly around institutions like West Delta University. Their influence extends into politics and civil society, breeding instability.
In Ondo State, the abduction and murder of Nelson Adepoyigi, a local APC chairman, signals a new phase of political criminality. Operating along the notorious Benin-Owo-Akure expressway, armed groups now target political actors, compounding the threats already faced by local farming communities due to herdsmen violence.
South East Fragility and State Response Gaps
In Anambra, the assassination of a lawyer and his client in Nanka—while likely not linked to IPOB—raises alarms over targeted killings. Despite the Homeland Security Law and the creation of Agunechemba, the state’s dedicated security corps, security gains have unravelled. Momentum has waned, coordination has lapsed, and public trust is fading.
Regional Reverberations and Transnational Threats
Beyond Nigeria, regional instability compounds the domestic crisis. In Niger, the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) has attacked the Chinese-backed Niger-Benin pipeline multiple times. These assaults, rooted in anti-junta sentiment, aim to sabotage a key economic artery and demonstrate the danger of insurgent alliances across ideological lines.
Similarly, the March 2025 jailbreak in Diapaga, Burkina Faso, which claimed 73 lives, underscores how terror groups like JNIM exploit thinly defended zones. This trend is echoed in Cameroon’s Far North, where ISWAP maintains mobility across the Lake Chad Basin, linking up with cells in Nigeria.
Workable Solutions: Charting a New Security Pathway
The crisis demands more than reaction—it requires recalibration. Here are six actionable recommendations:
Invest in Intelligence, Not Just Infantry: Expand the capacity of the DSS and similar agencies to lead intelligence-driven operations. Tactical intelligence has repeatedly shown greater impact than brute military deployment.
Establish Rapid Response Joint Task Forces: Agile, multi-agency units with embedded local knowledge should be deployed in high-threat regions—particularly in Borno, Niger, and Katsina—to intercept and neutralise emerging threats.
Secure Military Infrastructure with Tech: Adopt drone surveillance, AI-driven threat detection, and biometric perimeter control for military bases. The absence of early warning systems is a persistent vulnerability.
Revive and Strengthen State Security Corps: Initiatives like Agunechemba in Anambra and Operation Safe Haven in Plateau need sustained funding, clear leadership, and regular public accountability.
Decentralise and Democratise Policing: Implement state police frameworks backed by robust oversight. Community policing remains the most trusted first line of defence in many regions.
Disrupt Recruitment Pipelines: Work with educational institutions, faith leaders, and civil society to counter cult recruitment and radicalisation, particularly in Bayelsa, Delta, and Lagos.
The widening arc of violence across Nigeria—from insurgent strongholds to urban neighbourhoods—reveals a security ecosystem under strain. But this is not inevitable. By prioritising intelligence, enhancing inter-agency coordination, and restoring public trust in governance, Nigeria can stem the tide. The time for piecemeal fixes has passed. A national security reset, grounded in expertise, collaboration, and foresight, is the only viable path forward.
